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Broadband deployment and the bandwagon effect in the UK  
 
Advait Deshpande 
 
Abstract  
 
Purpose  
 
This paper looks at the extent to which the bandwagon effect played a part in Digital 
Subscriber Line (DSL) broadband adoption combined with the regulatory measures, the 
slowdown in the cable industry and the changes within the telecommunications 
industry in the United Kingdom (UK). The dynamics of broadband deployment, 
broadband adoption against a real-world supply-demand equation and the factors that 
influenced the outcome in the UK are examined in detail.  
 
Design/methodology/approach  
 
This paper combines historic facts and socio-economic analysis done from archival 
research and interview material to examine the outcome in which the less-heralded 
copper DSL technology outpaced cable broadband adoption. The analysis delves into 
the influence of the bandwagon effect and the two types of outcome associated with it 
i.e. network externalities and the complementary bandwagon effects.  
 
Findings  
 
The paper argues that the deployment of broadband technologies in the UK has not 
taken place solely on the merits of the technology or factors such as speed, end-user 
demand and costs. A combination of factors related to regulatory decisions, status of 
industry finances, commercial expediency, short-term technical benefits and the 
bandwagon effect are argued to be at work.   
 
  2 
Originality/value  
 
The paper is useful for historians, policy makers, regulators and communications 
industry analysts given its focus on broadband deployment in the UK in correlation to 
the bandwagon economics. 
 
Keywords: British Telecom, Broadband Networks, Telecommunications industry, 
Regulation, The bandwagon effect, United Kingdom 
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Introduction  
 
As of 2001, the broadband market in the United Kingdom (UK) was in its nascent state. 
In the early to late-1990s, the term "broadband" mostly referred to broadcast television 
and video content that was carried by cable networks (hence the mention of broadband 
cable in some of the literature. See (Fox, 1990)). Telecom industry initiatives like 
Integrated Service Digital Network (ISDN) and Broadband ISDN (B-ISDN) were in part 
aimed at bringing such high-bandwidth, video capabilities to the telecom networks 
(Kano et al., 1991). Video-on-demand (VOD) and pay-per-view were seen as the 
premium services that would provide additional revenue-earning opportunities in an 
increasingly competitive market (see (BT, 1994b; 1998b) for BT's forays into the on-
demand and broadcasting services; Young, 2012). In the mid to late 1990s, with the 
growth in the narrowband (i.e. dial-up) subscriptions for Internet access, telecom 
operators began to consider the alternatives to delivering high-speed data to the end-
users.  
 
In this context, British Telecom (BT) conducted Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) trials in 
1997-1998 to decide whether copper-based DSL was a good enough conduit for 
delivering Internet access. BT however remained uncertain about whether a market 
existed that would deliver a return on the investment for enabling the existing copper 
networks to deliver DSL connectivity. This question of return on investment (ROI) and 
what kind of services such high speed broadband [1] would deliver was also critical to 
the cable industry. The UK cable industry had consolidated into two major players, NTL 
(originally National Transcommunications Limited) and Telewest. Both cable operators 
needed an additional source of revenue to compete with British Sky Broadcasting 
(BSkyB) Corp., the premier satellite broadcasting services provider in the UK, on the 
content front. On the telephony front, NTL and Telewest had to contend with the 
significant market power (SMP) of BT. In addition, the extent to which such broadband 
connectivity could be monetised, and the kind of premium services it would enable, was 
unclear. With close to 10 million end-users already using dial-up Internet access (Office 
of Telecommunications i.e. Oftel, 2001a), the extent and speed with which such end-
users could be switched to a broadband  connection that cost significantly more was 
also difficult to ascertain.  
 
All these factors created an uncertain environment for telecom operators such as BT and 
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the cable operators such as NTL and Telewest in relation to rolling out broadband. This 
paper discusses the eventual outcome in relation to the deployment of copper-based 
DSL and coaxial cable broadband during the period from 2001 to the present day. Such 
deployments are considered in the context of the supply-and-demand dynamics for 
broadband technologies and the role of bandwagon effect on their adoption. The paper 
uses archival research and interview material to argue that in the deployment and 
adoption of broadband technologies, technical merits or economic feasibility were not 
the only factors that influenced the outcome. This argument is crucial since the success 
or failure of technologies is often attributed to benefits relative to their price or 
technical merits. The paper examines a range of factors associated with regulatory 
policy, industry circumstances and the bandwagon economics [2] to present a detailed 
analysis of the events.    
 
Bandwagon economics and the supply-demand equation  
 
The bandwagon effect in microeconomics refers to the situation where the benefits of a 
product or service derived by an end-user increase relative to the number of end-users 
who use the product or service (Leibenstein, 1950). Such an accumulation of end-users 
creates a strong demand for the product or service and influences the supply-side 
significantly. The bandwagon effect is one of three complementary effects in the theory 
of demand along with the Snob effect (which focuses on the exclusivity of a 
product/service driving the demand) and the Veblen effect (which focuses on the 
increase in the pricing of a product/service driving the demand) (Leibenstein, 1950).   
 
The bandwagon effect is manifested in two types of outcomes that influence the 
accumulation of end-users. The first type of bandwagon effect is the network 
externalities. Due to the network externalities, the benefits available to end-users 
increase or multiply because of the additional end-users who use or sign up for the 
product or service (See (Rohlfs, 1974) which specifically discusses interdependent 
demand in the communications industry and its relation to an increase in the number 
of end-users). The network externalities are associated with the demand-side equation 
of the bandwagon effect. The second type of bandwagon effect is known as the 
complementary bandwagon effects. As a result of the complementary bandwagon 
effects, the supply of the product or service increases in response to the cumulative 
demand for competitively priced complementary products or services created by the 
  5 
bandwagon effect (Haring et al, 2002; Rohlfs, 2001). In contrast to the network 
externalities, the complementary bandwagon effects are associated with the supply-side 
of the bandwagon effect.  
 
Part of the argument presented by the theory of demand and the bandwagon effect is 
that the end-user demand is not just driven by the pricing of products or services but 
also by the value and quality. The events throughout the 2000s show that the technical 
merits and pricing are just one of the factors that influenced the end-user demand and 
the deployment of broadband technologies. For a better understanding of the outcome, 
the factors that influenced the supply-side of the broadband deployment also need to 
be considered. To understand the influence of the bandwagon effect, the next two 
sections look at the factors that drove the rollout of broadband connections based on 
coaxial cable and copper DSL technologies respectively. This discussion is then followed 
by an analysis of the socio-political and regulatory factors that influenced such rollouts.  
 
Coaxial cable  
 
Following significant consolidation in the cable industry in the late 1990s, there were 
two major players left in the UK - NTL and Telewest. Despite the consolidation however, 
the coaxial cable network reached only 50% of UK households and businesses (Oftel, 
2002a). On the other hand, the copper-based Public Switched Telephone Network (i.e. 
PSTN used by telecom operators such as BT) had a near universal reach to the UK 
households and businesses. Although cable operators could carry BSkyB content 
through a wholesale agreement, and they were allowed to carry telephone services, they 
still sought a product that would be their unique selling proposition. With the 
narrowband market approaching saturation (Oftel, 2001a) [3], the demand for higher 
speeds and higher bandwidths was visible and suggested that a consumer market 
existed for broadband connectivity. The problem faced by the cable industry was of 
being unable to decide the extent of the rollout for such connectivity and its pricing.  
 
Compared to the telecom operators, the cable industry had one critical advantage when 
it came to broadband rollouts: its network was built on coaxial cable and Hybrid-Fibre 
Coax (HFC) technologies. In addition to being able to carry high-speed and high-
bandwidth data, the cable networks were also superior to the copper PSTN in suffering 
far less from signal attenuation. A copper DSL broadband connection would decrease in 
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bandwidth and speed as the distance of the end-user premises from the local exchange 
increased. The cable networks were not affected by this limitation and could deliver 
nearly the same bandwidth over the entire distance. In subsequent years, as the cable 
industry worked to minimise its legacy problems, such as fragmentation of standards, 
systems and services, the inherent technical merit of its network allowed the cable 
operators to position themselves as providers of a combined bundle of telephony, 
television and broadband services (Taylor, 2012). Effectively, on the back of the HFC 
investments made in the 1990s and the Data Over Cable Service Interface Specification 
(DOCSIS) standards, cable operators could offer a superior, vertically integrated 
broadband product. The telecom operators, in turn, saw an opportunity to counter the 
cable operators' broadband proposition by delivering next generation DSL capabilities. 
The intervention by the regulatory bodies for the UK telecommunications sector (Oftel, 
and later the Office of Communications i.e. Ofcom) proved crucial at this juncture. 
From 2004 onwards, Ofcom re-worked its unbundling strategy (Clarkson, 2012). The 
functional separation of BT (described below), achieved in 2006, further fuelled the 
competition for copper DSL as the next section explores.  
 
Copper DSL  
 
Compared to coaxial cable/HFC, copper DSL was mostly an unheralded technology. 
Although the DSL technology and some of its modulation techniques had been 
conceptualised as early as 1993 [4] (Cioffi, 2011a), it wasn’t until 1997-98 that BT 
considered DSL for delivering broadband Internet connectivity (BT, 1998a). With speeds 
of 2 Mbit/s that dropped progressively beyond the initial 3 km length of the copper wire 
from the end-user premises, DSL was perceived to be a short-term solution (Starr et al, 
1999). As a result, DSL was expected to tide over the limitations of narrowband 
connectivity until the eventual deployment of optical fibre.  
 
Despite its limitations however, DSL had other advantages. Not only would copper DSL 
allow the telecom operators to make the most of their existing copper assets (Cioffi, 
2011b; Shearman, 2012), the technology also enabled efficient utilisation of the 
bandwidths that copper could deliver. At the time of its conception in 1993-94, DSL was 
considered by incumbent telecom operators as a technology that would allow VOD 
services to be run on copper networks (See Cioffi, 2011a). Given the asymmetric nature 
of digital applications (covering video and data), Joseph Lechleider, one of the architects 
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of the DSL concept, suggested using more bandwidth downstream than upstream, a 
concept that was equally applicable to the nature of Internet traffic (Cioffi, 2011a). Such 
Asymmetric DSL (ADSL) meant that a copper pair could be effectively used to deliver 
speeds of 2 Mbit/s downstream and 128 kbit/s upstream (Starr et al., 1999), a capacity 
previously inconceivable in relation to copper. However, despite the subsequent 
improvements that allowed it to carry higher speeds over longer distances, the DSL 
broadband would still remain comparably slower than cable broadband on most 
occasions. 
 
An advantage of DSL was its relative ease in delivering broadband to existing 
telecommunications end-users. When the local exchange was equipped with DSL 
capability, the end-user’s premise only needed to be fitted with a modem and a micro-
filter device (more specifically an ADSL splitter) that would separate the data and voice 
traffic and deliver the promised broadband connectivity (Valdar, 2006). The self-
installation of such equipment by the end-users avoided the need for an engineer to visit 
the end-user premises and further lowered the cost of deployment for a telecom 
operator such as BT (Starr et al, 1999). When the prevailing economic and regulatory 
environment is considered, all these factors could be seen to have added up in favour of 
copper DSL technology despite its limited technical merit. These prevalent economic 
and regulatory factors are discussed in the next three sections.  
 
Narrowband and the network congestion  
 
Up to 2000-2001, most of the Internet connectivity in the UK was provided by 
narrowband connections based on the PSTN. Several Internet Service Providers (ISPs) 
used an unmetered wholesale access product from BT called Flat Rate Internet Access 
Call Origination (FRIACO). As a result of FRIACO, fully unmetered retail packages 
(giving unlimited data usage and no call costs) were available for £12.99 - £14.99 a month 
(Oftel, 2001a). With 10 million narrowband end-users and the Internet traffic doubling 
every 10 months, the end-user experience was soon expected to be plagued by network 
congestion and significantly lower speeds as a consequence (O’Reilly, 2005; 2011). Such 
congestion pointed to a need to upgrade the existing copper-based technology and to 
better manage the increasing demands on BT’s switches in the core network. The 
resolution depended not only on ascertaining the end-user demand but also on 
determining whether the end-users would be willing to pay the additional cost of 
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upgrading to broadband.  
 
By this time, Oftel needed to align its policies with the European Union (EU) regulatory 
framework. Oftel also needed to achieve the goals set by the Labour government for 
Internet access and speeds [5] (Oftel, 2001b). As a consequence, Oftel considered 
measures such as local loop unbundling (LLU). With LLU, Oftel aimed to lower 
consumer prices, increase competition in the access network and infuse additional 
investments in the network infrastructure (Oftel, 1998). Part of the reason to push 
unbundling was to accelerate the deployment of broadband technologies by telecom 
operators, particularly BT (Oftel, 1998). Despite the fact that BT had conducted its most 
recent trials of copper-based DSL technology in 1997-98, uncertainty prevailed in the 
fixed-line market about not just the potential of DSL but also the returns on such an 
investment due to demand constraints (Oftel, 2001b; Haring et al, 2002; Verwaayen, 
2012). 
 
An important impetus to BT’s decision making in relation to a DSL broadband rollout 
was the competitive threat from the cable industry which, with the consolidation into 
NTL and Telewest, had the potential for scale it lacked before. With regulatory price 
caps on its telephony revenue, BT also needed to create new revenue streams (Feasey, 
2012). Despite the technical superiority of the cable network, one of its main limitations 
was that it had at the most 50% market reach and broadband could not be delivered to 
about 5% of these premises due to technical limitations (Oftel, 2002a). Effectively only 
45% of the UK households and businesses could get cable broadband (Oftel, 2002a). In 
addition, the cable network suffered from significant fragmentation in terms of the 
network equipment, implementation of standards, end-user equipment, information 
systems and end-user services issues (Taylor, 2012). These problems were due to the 
original nature of cable franchise allocation in the late 1980s and 1990s as a result of 
which more than 100 cable franchise areas existed in the UK [6] (ITC, 1997). The 
presence of such disparate franchise structure led to the implementation of 
incompatible standards and equipment in these franchises (Taylor, 2012; Cluny, 2012). 
Most importantly such fragmentation meant that until the consolidation, the cable 
industry lacked the capability to rapidly build the economies of scale in order to 
compete with the telecom operators on pricing and upgrading the cable plants for 
delivering broadband. Some of these difficulties were exacerbated by the events related 
to the 2000-2001 dotcom crash, the subsequent recession and the changes in the United 
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States of America (USA) market (Feasey, 2012).  
 
Dotcom crash, recession and bankruptcy  
 
A significant amount of investment in the UK cable industry throughout the late 1980s 
and 1990s was made by cable and telecom companies such as Comcast, Bell Cablemedia, 
Nynex and Videotron which had parent operations in the USA and Canada (ITC, 1997). 
Some of these companies looked for opportunities in the UK, partly because of the 
regulatory restrictions in the USA which limited investment opportunities. Since the 
cable industry in the UK was significantly less regulated than the USA, the UK was an 
attractive investment destination (Feasey, 2012). By the mid to late 1990s, there were ten 
cable companies operating in the UK, with more coming later (ITC, 1997). In addition, 
not all of these operators functioned in contiguous franchise areas (Cluny, 2012). All of 
this resulted in the significantly fragmented nature of cable operations in the UK. With 
the dotcom boom in the late 1990s and the subsequent dotcom crash, some of these 
companies were severely stretched financially (Curwen, 2002). In the subsequent years, 
as the regulatory restrictions in the USA eased, the North American cable and telecom 
companies largely exited the UK market either by systematic withdrawal or by selling 
their UK cable assets completely (Feasey, 2012; Smale, 2012; Taylor, 2012). An example is 
Cable & Wireless Communications which was created in 1997 with the merger of 
Mercury Communications and the UK cable operations of Nynex, Bell Cablemedia and 
Videotron (C&W, 1997; ITC, 1997). These events meant that although the UK cable 
industry could finally operate on a regional scale it had previously been incapable of, it 
no longer had the financial wherewithal to do so. The outcome of this financial crunch, 
combined with the costs of integrating the fragmented UK cable operations and the 
pressure from BSkyB and BT, was the near-collapse of the UK cable industry (Smale, 
2012; Taylor, 2012). The two companies that had emerged in the consolidation, NTL and 
Telewest, went into administration in 2002 (Curwen, 2002; 2003) and had to undergo 
financial restructuring. Consequently, the UK cable industry did not have the financial 
strength to push for cable broadband in the nascent stage of the broadband market. As a 
result, despite the technical advantages of cable broadband, its deployment was 
significantly constrained. 
 
Similar financial constraints also affected BT which had made large investments outside 
the UK throughout the 1990s. Most of these investments were made on the back of its 
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annual profits to the tune of £1-2 bn in the UK in the early 1990s [7] (BT, 1992; 1993b; 
1994a). Since BT was prohibited from carrying television content on its main network 
until 1999, it had continually argued an inability to invest in deploying optical fibre in 
its UK access network, citing lack of opportunities to recoup its costs (BT, 1993a). In 
addition, although BT had retained SMP in a number of market segments, it faced 
increasing competition with the introduction of mobile telephony. Another factor 
responsible for the increased competition was the disbanding of BT’s duopoly with 
Mercury Communications and the resultant full liberalisation of the UK 
telecommunications industry in 1992. Some of BT’s major investments during this 
period were the costly 3G licence in the UK (£4.03 billion in 2000. See BT, 2000, p. 14), 
3G licence in Germany (for Viag Interkcom purchased at the cost £5.13 bn in 2000-2001. 
See BT, 2001b, p. 14), Netherlands (BT paid £1.2bn to acquire Telfort in April 2000 and 
paid £267 million for a Dutch 3G licence. See BT, 2001b, p. 14) and France (BT acquired a 
26% stake in Cegetel in September 1996 for £1 billion. See BT, 1997, p. 19). This meant a 
significant amount of BT’s financial resources were tied up not just in the UK but 
outside the UK as well. Although BT made tidy sums of profit on some of these ventures 
[8], by 1999 BT losses from its ventures outside UK grew to £342 mn (BT, 1999, p. 31). By 
March 2000, BT's net debt grew to £8,700 million with an increase of £7,747 million in 
the financial year 1999-2000 (BT, 2000, p. 36). In the financial year 2000-2001, the net 
debt rose to £27.9 billion and BT had to take measures to reduce its debt (BT, 2001a, p. 
2). Part of the subsequent restructuring led to demerger and eventual sell off of BT’s 
mobile services business in Europe [9]. Although the £17.7bn generated enabled BT to 
reduce its debt significantly, BT would miss out on the higher Average Revenue Per User 
(ARPU) earned by mobility companies over the next decade (Crowcroft, 2012). BT would 
also have to endure low revenue streams in the existing saturated fixed-line telephony 
market in which its prices were capped (Feasey, 2012). The outcome was that BT not only 
lacked the justification for investment into optical fibre but also that DSL was the most 
expedient option in economic and commercial terms for delivering broadband. The 
drive for DSL deployment was further spurred by the regulatory measures adopted by 
Oftel/Ofcom and some of the key decisions made by BT as the next section examines in 
detail.  
 
Regulation, further consolidation and unbundling  
 
Aside from the financial problems faced by the cable companies, the focus of their 
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activities after the consolidation remained on reducing the problems of fragmentation, 
incompatible systems and standardising equipment across regions (Cluny, 2012). The 
cable industry was unsure of the potential of broadband and the extent to which 
Internet-based premium services could be monetised (Cluny, 2012). As a result, NTL and 
Telewest chose to focus on improving their operations to achieve better economies of 
scale. In March 2006, the operations of NTL and Telewest were consolidated to create 
"NTL:Telewest". A further merger with Virgin Mobile in July 2006 led to the creation of 
a rebranded, single entity - "Virgin Media". In effect, Virgin Media became the first UK 
company to offer a quadruple play of services i.e. television, broadband, fixed and 
mobile telephony (Smale, 2012). 
 
During this period of further consolidation in the UK cable industry, the DSL rollout 
had given BT and the other telecom operators wider reach in the UK for their broadband 
products by 2006 [10]. Although the process of unbundling had been initiated in 1999, 
very few operators showed any interest in unbundling until the mid-2000s (Ofcom, 
2004). This was partly due to the unfavourable economics of unbundling for the Other 
Line Operators (OLOs) (Oftel, 1998; Sandbach and Durnell, 2002). The OLOs, as a 
result, had mostly relied on the wholesale line rental (WLR) services to rent the capacity 
and DSL connectivity from BT instead of building their own routes into the BT 
exchanges. By the mid-2000s, the market was deemed to be over-reliant on BT’s 
wholesale products (Ofcom, 2004; 2005). The increased end-user demand suggested 
that the deployment of next generation DSL equipment in the form of ADSL2 and 
ADSL2+ technologies was needed. This led to an increased interest in unbundling and 
spurred an intervention on the part of Ofcom (see Stern (2004) for changes in the 
regulatory approach with the transition from Oftel to Ofcom). Because of the limited 
success of the earlier unbundling initiative, Ofcom's focus this time centred on enabling 
equal access and ensuring that the OLOs' broadband products were not disadvantaged 
by BT's wholesale pricing (Ofcom, 2004; 2005; 2006). 
 
Another aspect of the increased DSL rollout was that in 2002, BT had set an ambitious 
agenda for rolling out DSL connectivity to the exchanges and the end-users’ premises. 
This agenda was set in motion by BT's then Chief Executive Ben Verwaayen. He also 
devised specific time-bound targets for BT to achieve these goals. Combined with the 
take up of wholesale connectivity, the aim was to deliver five million broadband 
connections in the UK by 2006 (BT, 2002, p. 13). This rollout relied on the legacy copper 
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infrastructure which was mostly owned by BT. As a result, BT held SMP in the wholesale 
broadband market segment and led the retail broadband segment [11] (Ofcom, 2006). In 
consequence Ofcom decided to intervene in order to inject more competition into the 
broadband market.  
 
With the possibility of Ofcom taking BT to the Competition Commission (CC) and 
recommending a structural break up of BT, an agreement was reached between BT and 
Ofcom for functional separation of BT operations (BT, 2006; Ofcom, 2006; See Stern, 
2004 for discussion on the policy of structural separation in the UK regulatory regime). 
Under this agreement, BT would create a separate division named "Openreach" for its 
network operations and ensure equality of access and pricing for the OLOs. This meant 
the charges paid by BT’s Retail division and the OLOs for Openreach services would be 
the same without any cross-subsidy, prioritisation or preference to BT's operations. The 
creation of Openreach and the related equality of access conditions played a significant 
part in fuelling the competition for delivering broadband (Pemberton, 2012; Young, 
2012). By 2009, TalkTalk, Virgin Media and BT Retail had almost similar market share 
within the retail broadband space with Sky also registering double digit market share 
[12]. The outcome was that the broadband tariffs continued to reduce in favour of the 
end-user [13] and provided further incentives to DSL broadband adopters. By this time, 
the near universal adoption of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
(IEEE) 802.11 WiFi standards in devices such as laptops, mobile phones and customer 
premise equipments (CPEs) had made broadband adoption an easier and more 
attractive prospect for end-users. The improvements in the speeds delivered by the 
802.11 standards and the increased availability of wireless connectivity via WiFi hotspots 
provided an important benefit for the growing number of end-users. The reliance of 
these WiFi hotspots on DSL broadband combined with the increased demand and 
competition was one of the factors that led to the introduction of ADSL2 and ADSL2+ 
products. Effectively, the average actual residential broadband speeds in the UK 
increased up to 7.6 Mbit/s by November 2011 (Ofcom, 2009; 2011; 2012a; Shearman, 2012; 
Young, 2012). 
 
The impact of this race within the DSL broadband space was that the cable broadband 
adoption numbers lagged behind the DSL broadband numbers throughout this period 
[14]. With the cable industry focused on consolidation and integrating their operations, 
BT's introduction of DSL broadband via a registration scheme successfully overtook the 
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cable numbers by 2003-2004 (see note 14). Considering the near-ubiquitous reach of the 
copper PSTN, the availability of DSL broadband connections was also significantly 
higher than the cable broadband technology (see note 10). However, with the creation of 
Virgin Media, the threat from the cable industry became more credible (Cluny, 2012). 
Since then the increasing broadband speeds delivered by Virgin Media have led to 
additional investments in Very-high-bit-rate digital subscriber line (VDSL), Fibre-To-
The-Cabinet (FTTC) and, potentially vectored VDSL deployment by BT and investments 
in ADSL2+ by the LLU operators (Clarkson, 2012; Ofcom, 2009). The next section 
discusses these events and the extent to which the relative success of DSL broadband 
was influenced by the bandwagon effect.  
 
The bandwagon effect on the broadband race  
 
One of the problems faced by the telecom operators was that without a critical mass of 
end-users, broadband could not be delivered at prices comparable to the existing 
narrowband connections. Another difficulty faced by the operators was that of 
converting the existing narrowband end-users to sign up for broadband. This meant 
convincing the end-users of the superiority and advantages of the broadband 
connections offered by telecom or cable operators. Having realised the importance of 
broadband, Oftel wanted to promote competition in the broadband market by enabling 
unbundling of local loop and allowing OLOs to deliver copper-DSL to end-users. It can 
be argued that BT’s approach until this time had been cautious and effectively hedged 
on the basis of the volume of dial-up connections and a lack of clear demand for 
broadband at a higher price than dial-up (Pemberton, 2012). This is crucial in that 
although the end-users arguably wanted higher-speed, the extent to which they were 
willing to absorb the cost of copper DSL rollout and the higher monthly charges was 
uncertain. Thus BT’s position depended on the justifiability of investments in the face 
of this uncertainty. Its solution was the ADSL registration scheme (described below) 
which eventually resulted in a rapid DSL rollout throughout the UK and left cable 
broadband adoption behind in its wake [15]. 
 
In particular, the bandwagon effect can be observed to be at work in relation to BT’s 
rapid expansion of DSL capability into the exchanges. When BT launched the ADSL 
registration scheme, it was in part to justify the investment in DSL, gauge the demand 
for higher-speed and more expensive service (than dial-up), to enable a deployment 
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plan for BT’s broadband products and position its response to BT shareholders and 
Oftel. As part of this ADSL registration scheme, subject to the cost of DSL deployment 
being viable, BT promised to rollout DSL equipment to exchanges in those areas which 
had achieved a minimum threshold of end-user registrations (Oftel, 2002b). The 
minimum threshold varied depending upon the size of the exchange and the area under 
consideration. Such a strategy was arguably in line with BT’s traditionally cautious 
approach towards rolling out new technologies (Cioffi, 2011b) and in part influenced by 
the need to justify investments given its financial position in 2001. BT's approach also 
mirrors Rohlfs' (1974) argument about using community of interest groups to achieve 
maximum (equilibrium) demand despite small size of initial user set. Despite field-
trials during the later 1990s, DSL was a relatively untested product in actual 
deployments and the speeds offered by copper varied significantly depending on the 
distance of the end-user from the exchange and the quality of the line. In the context of 
the 2000-2001 economic recession, a short-term benefit of DSL to the embattled 
telecommunications operators (including BT) was that it would allow higher speeds to 
be delivered without the significantly higher investments of fibre. The registration 
scheme proved that sufficient demand existed and once the rollouts began, the end-
users signing up for the DSL product began to accumulate quickly (see note 14).  
 
The initial DSL broadband product was costlier than the existing narrowband products 
[16]. However, the speed benefits of DSL broadband were significant [17]. In addition, 
unlike the narrowband connection, a DSL connection also allowed the telephone line to 
be available while the Internet was being used. It is arguable that the early adoption of 
DSL broadband was driven by both these advantages over the existing narrowband 
connections. Having managed to ascertain the demand for DSL, BT's push for 
installation of DSL equipment was also set apace by the goals set by its then chief 
executive Ben Verwaayen (BT, 2002; Valdar, 2012; Verwaayen, 2012). As a result, the 
uncertainty around the financial viability of broadband deployment was successfully 
over-ridden. These factors resulted in a positive supply-demand side equation in which 
the increasing number of end-user registration led to wider DSL broadband roll-out. 
The subsequent DSL roll-out in turn was spurred by the increased demand.  
 
Such a situation demonstrates both the types of the bandwagon effect at work. The 
network externalities are evidenced by the increase in the end-user registrations (see 
note 14). It became obvious that the DSL rollout would indeed take place subject to 
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registered end-user interest and that it clearly delivered benefits over the existing 
narrowband connections. In consequence, the demand side of the bandwagon effect 
was firmly established [18]. On the other hand, the complementary bandwagon effects 
are evidenced by the extent to which better speeds and the ubiquity of WiFi accelerated 
the DSL broadband rollouts [19]. Each of these supply-side effects contributed to the 
increased availability of DSL broadband. This rollout was also aided by a supply-side 
push on BT's part in response to regulatory pressure, reduced margins on the telephony 
services revenues and the availability of BT wholesale DSL products. The reliance of the 
OLOs on the BT wholesale DSL product as a means of competing, pointed to BT's 
stranglehold on the broadband market. As a result, Oftel pursued unbundling and the 
functional separation of BT to promote more competition.  
 
Throughout this period, the capability of the cable networks to offer higher speeds and 
the possibility of market loss kept the telecom operators motivated and resulted in 
deployments of ADSL and ADSL2+ by the LLU operators and BT (Clarkson, 2012; Young, 
2012).  The cable operators, in turn, needed to distinguish their services since the 
telephony services were mostly commoditised. Their reliance on the wholesale content 
from BSkyB meant that delivering higher-speed broadband was a potentially important 
revenue stream. With the purchase of Virgin Mobile and the final consolidation into the 
"Virgin Media" brand, the cable network could deliver potentially quadruple-play of 
services and allow Virgin Media to position itself as an end-to-end service provider 
instead of just being a television or telephony operator (Cluny, 2012). Thus, although the 
adoption of cable broadband lagged behind DSL broadband in the long run, the 
competitive threat of cable broadband was one of the key factors that influenced DSL 
broadband rollout and the bandwagon effect that accelerated it.  
 
Conclusions  
 
Until the mid-1990s, broadband was mostly associated with the delivery of broadcast 
television and on-demand video. The communications industry's expectations centred 
on delivering premium content services over the networks and the innovation was 
driven by the projected demand for such services. These expectations about delivering 
video as a revenue stream are seen to persist until late 1990s. By 1999-2000, the demand 
for the Internet had become evident as witnessed by the dial-up adoption numbers. This 
opened up an unforeseen revenue opportunity for the communications industry. The 
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focus of delivering a broadband service shifted to delivering a high-speed connection to 
the Internet instead of delivering just television or video-on-demand.  
 
The copper-based PSTN had significant limitations when it came to delivering a high-
speed connection. The alternatives available for the fixed-line operators (including 
cable) were DSL, coaxial cable and optical fibre. In the short term, optical fibre was 
ruled out due to the costs involved and the fact that the financial resources available 
were limited. That left DSL and cable broadband as the options in contention. DSL 
allowed the telecom operators to deliver broadband by sweating the existing copper 
assets. While it cost significantly less compared to optical fibre, DSL still required an 
investment that a company like BT would need to justify to its shareholders and 
investors. Although some trials had been done with DSL technology, it remained an 
untested technology in terms of large field-deployments.  
 
However, the early adoption of DSL broadband was not driven by pricing benefits but 
the advantages it offered over the prevalent narrowband market. The speed and 
convenience of broadband effectively meant that as the DSL rollout gathered 
momentum, the number of end-users jumping on the DSL bandwagon also increased in 
proportion. At the same time, due to the prevailing market and economic 
circumstances, cable broadband, a superior technology, lagged behind DSL broadband 
in end-user adoption.  
 
The bandwagon effect propelled the subsequent DSL adoption due to the demand for 
better Internet speeds and was also aided significantly by the falling prices. Cable 
broadband, despite the head-start in end-user adoption, was plagued by legacy issues 
within the cable industry. Although the telecom operators were also faced with financial 
problems, the DSL broadband did not suffer from the problems of fragmentation and 
incompatible standards. This meant that the rollout of DSL equipment was easier to 
accomplish. The uncertainty and questions around return on DSL investment faced by 
BT were partly answered by the registration scheme which clearly demonstrated a 
demand for higher speeds. The subsequent reduction in prices can be attributed to a 
combination of the competitive threat from cable, regulatory pressure from Ofcom in 
the form of unbundling and the increased economies of scale due to the wider rollout of 
DSL equipment. The growth in end-user demand, increased rollout of DSL equipment 
and the introduction of next-generation DSL technologies that delivered higher speeds 
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were the benefits of the bandwagon effect. The growth in end-users and the impact on 
pricing of broadband connections being offered indicate the network externalities that 
drove the demand-side of the DSL bandwagon. On the other hand, the subsequent 
acceleration in the rollout of DSL equipment at the BT exchanges, increased speeds due 
to the push for ADSL2, ADSL2+ deployments by LLU operators, ubiquity of WiFi-
capable devices and wider availability of WiFi hotspots illustrates the complementary 
bandwagon effects that influenced the supply-side of the DSL bandwagon. 
 
That the bandwagon effect worked in DSL's favour was a result driven by the prevailing 
technical, regulatory and socio-economic factors. The commercial and political 
expediency of DSL was aided by the combined influence of such factors along with the 
benefits that increased with end-user adoption (thus echoing the premise of the 
bandwagon effect). In the UK, the bandwagon effect led to positive supply-demand 
equation between the end-users, the incumbent operator (BT), OLOs and the regulator 
(Oftel & Ofcom).  
 
A critical catalyst for the acceleration of DSL broadband adoption was the unbundling 
initiatives and landmark agreement in 2006 that created Openreach. The arrangements 
for equality of access and transparent retail-wholesale pricing triggered by the 
functional separation of BT were unique in the telecommunications regulatory 
environment. Its influence on the outcome can be evidenced by the lowering of 
broadband tariffs and entry of LLU operators such as TalkTalk and Sky into the UK 
market. This particular regulatory intervention meant that Ofcom’s goal of delivering 
the best price environment for the end-users (including wholesale customers such as 
OLOs that rented capacity from BT) and developing a competitively priced market was 
fulfilled for a short term. Effectively, the bandwagon effect worked in tandem with 
regulatory decisions, status of industry finances, commercial expediency and short-term 
technical benefits of DSL over optical fibre and the competition from cable and LLU 
operators. The combination of all these factors stimulated broadband deployment and 
adoption in the UK. As a result, although cable broadband had led in terms of end-user 
numbers and technical merits as of 2001, by the end of the 2000s, DSL broadband 
deployment and adoption was firmly in the lead.  
 
Notes  
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1 - As of November 2001, dial-up or narrowband access was defined as "speeds up to and 
including 128 kilobits per second (kbps)" (Oftel, 2001a, p. 3). Broadband was defined as 
"higher bandwidth, always-on services, offering data rates of 128 kbps and above." 
(Oftel, 2001a, p. 3). Although Oftel/Ofcom still defines broadband as minimum 128 
kbit/s, in practice the minimum speeds delivered have risen to 2 Mbit/s (Ofcom, 2006; 
2009). 
 
2 – This paper uses the term bandwagon economics to denote the superset of ideas 
associated with the bandwagon effect, network externalities, complementary 
bandwagon effects and their influence on the economics of technology deployment and 
adoption.  
 
3 - The November 2001 Oftel report estimates that there were over 400 ISPs operating in 
the UK. 80% of the online households and 63% of the Small & Medium Enterprises 
(SMEs) with Internet access relied on narrowband connections. With 10 million homes 
and 2 million SMEs using narrowband, the market was arguably saturated. 
 
4 - Joseph Lechleider from Bellcore, proposed the use of ISDN’s improved echo-
cancelled 2B1Q line code for each of T1’s two twisted pairs thus yielding a speed of 800 
kbit/s per pair i.e. 1.6 Mbit/s in total. He termed this High-speed digital subscriber line 
(HDSL), generally considered the first variant of DSL. See (Cioffi, 2011a) for further 
details.  
 
5 - The stated goal was for the "UK to have the most extensive and competitive 
broadband market in the G7 by 2005" (Oftel, 2001b, p. 3) 
 
6 - The Independent Television Commission (ITC) Annual Report 1997 mentions that 
124 franchise areas had been awarded by Cable Authority before 1991. In the same 
report, ITC mentions 39 additional franchises being advertised or licensed in 1997. 
 
7 - BT's profits after tax for the financial year ending in 1992, 1993 and 1994 were 
£2.07bn, £1.24bn, £1.8bn respectively (BT, 1992; 1993b; 1994a). 
 
8 - e.g. BT agreed to sell Airtel in Spain to Vodafone for £1.1 billion (BT, 2001b, p. 31). BT 
also sold its 34% stake in Sunrise communications in Switzerland to Tele Danmark for 
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the equivalent of £464 million in cash, realising a profit of over £400 million. (BT, 2001b, 
p. 10) 
 
9 - The demerger was completed in November 2001 when mmO2 plc was created. The 
mobile services provided by mmO2 would be under the "O2" brand (Curwen, 2009). In 
2005, Telefónica, the Spanish Telecommunications operator agreed to buy mmO2 and 
BT Group’s mobile business in the Europe for £17.7 bn (Curwen, 2006).   
 
10 - The cable network footprint mostly remained the same at 50% of the UK homes and 
businesses. On the other hand, the DSL broadband reach grew from 60% as of 2001 
(Oftel, 2001a) to 99.7% of homes and businesses by 2006 (BT, 2006, p. 9) 
 
11 - As of 2005, BT's portfolio of wholesale products accounted for 70% of the broadband 
connections (Ofcom, 2006, p. 146). In 2005, BT's share of the retail broadband market 
was 24%, the highest amongst all broadband providers (Ofcom, 2006, p. 147). In the 
retail segment, BT’s nearest competitors were NTL and Telewest at 20% and 10% market 
share respectively (Ofcom, 2006, p. 147). 
 
12 - In 2009, the market share in the retail broadband segment for BT, Virgin media, 
TalkTalk and Sky was 25.9%, 22.5%, 24.7% and 12.4% respectively (Ofcom, 2009). 
 
13 - The average monthly cost of DSL for residential and small business end-users in 
November 2001 was £40 (Oftel, 2001a). The average monthly cost of DSL for residential 
and small business end-users in September 2003 was £22-£24 (Oftel, 2003). By 2012, 
when bundled with landline (excluding line rental) the monthly costs were as low as 
£6.49 depending on the contract length, speed and data usage (Ofcom, 2012a). 
 
14 - As of December 2001, the numbers of end-users on cable broadband & DSL were 
196,000 & 136,000 respectively (Oftel, 2002a).  In July 2002, the number of end-users of 
cable broadband had risen to 419,000 compared to DSL which had 290,000 end-users 
(Oftel, 2002b, p. 1). By September 2003, this trend had reversed. The number of DSL 
end-users had nudged ahead (and have remained ahead) to 1,380,000 to that of 
1,232,000 for cable broadband (Oftel, 2003). In Q1 2012, the number of residential and 
small business end-users on DSL (including BT, LLU & non-LLU) were 16,173,000 
compared to  4,165,000 for cable (Ofcom, 2012b). 
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15 - More than 560,000 potential end-users registered for the BT ADSL registration 
scheme by September 2003 (Oftel, 2003). This indicated a potential 50% increase in the 
number of end-users. See note 14 for further details of the increase in the DSL numbers. 
 
16 - In November 2001, the average monthly cost of DSL for residential and small 
business end-users was £40. Compared to this the average cost of a FRIACO-based, fully 
unmetered narrowband connection was only £12.99 – £14.99 (See Oftel, 2001a, pp. 4-7) 
 
17 - The basic rate offered by modern narrowband connections was 64 kbit/s. With pure 
text transmission, a narrowband connection could deliver 320 kbit/s but with significant 
reduction in the web experience. DSL broadband connections were required to deliver 
minimum speeds of 128 kbit/s (Oftel, 2001a). 
 
18 - The registrations started in June 2002 when the number of DSL end-users were 
290,000 compared to 419,000 end-users for cable broadband (Oftel, 2002b). By 
September 2003, the scheme had received 560,000 registrations during which time the 
DSL end-users had increased to 1,380,000 (Oftel, 2003). 
 
19 - At the start of the registration scheme, the number of UK households covered by 
DSL was 66% with 1115 exchanges being DSL-enabled (Oftel, 2002b). By September 
2003, the availability of DSL had increased to 80% with 1708 exchanges being DSL-
enabled (Oftel, 2003). 
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